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22.1 Background
Thirty years ago, September 1986 to be precise, when I arrived at Stan-
ford, Dwight Bolinger threw a barbeque for the incoming linguistics
class. I was absolutely shocked. Bolinger was a demigod1 of linguistics,
someone I knew only through his work and stories, both transmitted
to me by Ferenc Kiefer, and now I get to talk to him in person, eat
his pulled pork, and drink his beer? I was delighted to see that, re-
tired or not, he was just as sharp in real life as his work. There were
plenty of CSLI people and other folks loosely affiliated with the lin-
guistics department around – this was the first time I met Lauri. When
my student Ga´bor Recski came back from *Sem 2015, he told me a
very similar story: in a sea of younger faces there was this older guy,
asking very sharp questions about all aspects of the work, and he was
stunned to find out this was Lauri Karttunen himself! Somehow, some
of the interests and esthetics of the older generation will rub off on the
students, and (largely unbeknownst to me) a great deal of what Lauri
thought was interesting I also ended up being interested in.
Following on many years of research in this direction, recently Kart-
*Thanks to Tibor Beke (UMass Lowell), Tim Fernando (Trinity College Dublin),
Ferenc Kiefer (HAS Research Institute of Linguistics), Ma´rton Makrai (HAS RIL),
Chris Pin˜o´n (Universite´ Lille 3), Ga´bor Recski (HAS RIL) and Ka´roly Varasdi
(Henrich Heine University, Du¨sseldorf) for cogent criticism of the draft version.
1http://zvon.org/comp/r/ref-Jargon_file.html#Terms~demigod
511
Tokens of Meaning: Papers in Honor of Lauri Karttunen.
Cleo Condoravdi and Tracy Holloway King (eds.).
Copyright © 2018, CSLI Publications.
512 / Andra´s Kornai
tunen (2014) offered a force dynamics2-like analysis of what he calls
two-way implicatives following Karttunen (1971), verbs like English
manage and Finnish hennoa, the implication of which Karttunen il-
lustrates with Hennoitko tappaa kissan? ‘Did you overcome your pity
to kill the cat?’, akin to ‘overcome your fear’ for dare. Here we will look
at a finite-state account of these verbs, finally bringing together two of
the main threads of Lauri’s research so far held together only by the
esthetics. While hard to put in words exactly, clearly this esthetics has
something to do with mechanization, going back at the very least to
the the Calculus Ratiocinator of Leibniz, himself a tinkerer, building
his Stepped Reckoner3 from cogwheels the same way as Lauri builds
his morphophonology from FSTs. For Leibniz, the elementary pieces
were Monads, for Karttunen they are finite mechanisms which must
be, in a sense we will make more precise in Section 22,4, memoryless.
The luxury of a Turing Machine tape is not given to us, everything we
remember we must remember at great cost, building it into the state
space of the machinery as we go along. Crucially, there are no variables,
and there is no variable binding, so who does what to whom will need
to be specified by a different mechanism. We will use cases for this
purpose.
Frege (1892) already notes that the failure of the implicatures that
such verbs carry will not render false the sentence that uses the verb,
and most subsequent authorities, including Karttunen, share this view.
What needs to be made explicit in this regard is that sentences whose
meaning cannot be tied to truth conditions (other than truth conditions
pertaining to the mind-state of the speaker and the hearer) actually
demonstrate that truth-conditional semantics is a blunt instrument,
incapable of assigning meaning to sentences. Indeed, our main thesis
here will be that either we are interested in truth, or we are interested
in what verbs like dare mean.
Our goal in this paper is to formalize a lexically driven analysis in
terms of a mechanical, finite state calculus. Since such an analysis,
practically the only one that makes sense from the perspective of the
grammar, is compatible only with a weak form of commonsense reason-
ing, as opposed to a muscular Tarski-style theory of truth, we obtain
the result claimed in the title.
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_dynamics
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepped_Reckoner
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22.2 The elementary pieces
The good thing is that we already know what dare means: ‘to be brave
enough to do something difficult or dangerous’ (Cambridge Dictionary
of English); ‘to be brave enough to do something that is risky or that
you are afraid to do’ (Longman); ‘to have enough courage or confi-
dence to do something, to not be too afraid to do something’ (Merriam-
Webster). This is a special case of the general analysis that Karttunen
offers for the whole class of verbs: ‘overcoming an obstacle’ with the
obstacle being fear for dare, indifference for bother, empathy for hennoa
and so on.
Here and in what follows we will rely heavily on the ‘algebraic’ style
of lexical semantics first described in Kornai (2010a) and Kornai (2012)
and now spelled out in far greater detail in Kornai (in press) and in
a series of more computationally oriented papers such as Kornai et al.
(2015). Remarkably, no part of the apparatus employed in this paper
was developed with implicative verbs in mind.
We will use hypergraph-style notation with two kinds of concepts,
unaries, which we will write in typewriter font and binaries, written
in small caps. There are only three types of edges: 0 used both for
attribution John is brave and for is a indiscriminately. In larger graphs,
we will write dashed arrows, −→ instead of 0→. The two other arrow
types are the familiar ‘1’ (ordinary→ in larger graphs) for subject, and
‘2’ (dotted arrow) for object. For ease of presentation, we introduce a
special symbol @ that will be placed in the middle of arrows that should
in their entirety be the terminal point of some other arrow, so that we
can display the object of seeing in video patrem venire as
video

patrem @ // venire
Figure 1. Video patrem venire
John dares VP is taken to mean John does VP in conjunction with
VP is risky, and for the moment we leave open the issue whether it’s
risky for John, or really risky for everybody. What we did here was
to incorporate a hidden element, ‘object being risky’ for dare, ‘object
being boring’ or ‘subject being indifferent’ for bother, and ‘subject being
humane’ for hennoa. As it happens, the calculus we use is detached from
part of speech, and we make no distinction between the adjective risky,
the V’ is risky, and the noun risk, but this lack of morphosyntactic
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typing will not be relied on heavily in what follows, except for making
it easier to draw the graphs and talk about their nodes.
A significant advantage of relying on such hidden elements is that
they all fit in the category of difficulty. As a result, they will partic-
ipate in a larger frame involving virtue
1← overcome 2→ difficulty.
The virtue, be it bravery as in the Cambridge and Longman dictio-
naries, or courage/confidence, as in Merriam-Webster, comes for free
here, in that bravery
0→ virtue, diligence 0→ virtue, decency 0→
virtue, etc. come from the lexical definition of these concepts, and
no doubt winter-hardiness, required in the analysis of tarjeta, is a
virtue, perhaps a monomorphemic one in Finnish, if Sapir-Whorf has
any bite.4
Now it is plausible that fear
0→ difficulty (or obstacle, as Karttunen
(2014) has it) is somehow a piece of lexical knowledge, but this does
not work for the other cases: it is rather unlikely that indifference or
empathy are lexically specified for genus difficulty/obstacle. Such
a conclusion, if not available lexically, must somehow be derived by
a process of typecasting. The essence of the force-dynamic analysis is
that dare and hennoa both is a overcome. There is every reason to
suppose that overcome subcategorizes for a power subject and an
obstacle object, and to make some action an instance of overcome,
its subject must be typecast to power and its object to obstacle. That
virtue is a power is hard to deny, and by transitivity of is a we can
treat all implicative subjects under this heading. With the implicative
objects, this is less trivial: empathy gets to be an obstacle only because
hennoa is a overcome, and outside this frame we cannot draw the
usual conclusions, e.g. that obstacles are bad things and therefore being
humane is a bad thing.
Before turning to the details of the finite state analysis, let us con-
sider how an ordinary sentence, such as John dared to criticize the
mayor will be analyzed. The matrix verb is dare and it is John who
does the daring, so we have John
1← dare, and it is also John who
does the criticizing, so we have John
1← criticize. How the subject
equi is effected during the parsing process is something we leave to
the phenogrammar, the point here is that few grammarians (including
LFGers who would use an XCOMP here) would seriously doubt that
the subject of both verbs is the same John. The object of the criticism
is no doubt the mayor, and the object of daring is the entire criticizing
4Inquiries to Finnish-speaking friends produced pakkasenkesta¨va¨, but with a cau-
tionary note that this is probably more appropriate for plants than for animals or
humans, and kylma¨nkesta¨va¨ with perhaps a bit less strict subcategorization.
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the mayor.
John ooOO dare

criticize @ // mayor
Figure 2. John dared to criticize the mayor
As we said, dare is a overcome, and whoever dares actually has power,
or at least he thinks he does, to overcome risk. In fact, we can rely on a
dictionary definition of bravery, courage as ‘power to overcome risk’ or
‘power to overcome fright caused by risk’, or even ‘power to overcome
one’s own fright caused by risk’. Neither the final cause nor the precise
application site of the power ends up being very relevant for the task
at hand, which is to explain certain implications, whose non-fulfillment
makes sentences using dare infelicitous, but not outright false. With
criticizing the mayor it is rather clear that mayors are powerful people,
and criticizing the powerful is dangerous. But when we say
(1) #John dared to chew gum
we need to abductively infer some theory that makes chewing gum
dangerous. Perhaps John had throat surgery, and the wounds have
not quite healed. Perhaps he is in the presence of some superior who
considers this disrespectful. Perhaps he was told the gum could be
laced with poison. There are many theories that would make the use
of dare felicitous, and we need not choose among them. But we do
need to draw the implication from dare to risk or danger. As with
obstacle versus difficulty above, we need not be very precise which of
these terms is operative here. What matters is the semantic concept,
not the (English) printname we assign to it.
We will posit dare
2→danger as part of the lexical entry of dare,
i.e. the selectional restriction that its object is dangerous. Similarly,
the object of deign is low status (or perhaps the subject is high sta-
tus), that of remember is hard to memorize, and so on. Manage has an
object that is simply difficult, manner unspecified. Since it is the rela-
tionship of the subject to the object that is getting characterized by the
implicative verb, we often have a choice between alternative framings:
e.g. with deign we may be describing (i) the subject as high status;
(ii) the object as low status; or (iii) the subject as higher status than
the object. These alternatives are logically equivalent, since by default
things are neither high nor low status. Yet it is quite conceivable that
different speakers have different lexical entries for deign, and different
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lexicalization options may play differently with negation. Translational
near-equivalents in different languages may also differ only in the choice
between (i)-(iii).
22.3 The mechanism
Again we begin with the easy pieces. The theory we rely on takes
unaries simply to be bundles of essential properties, so for example the
fox is four-legged, animal, hairy, red, clever. Since we make
no distinction between attribution (the fox is hairy) and is a (the fox
is an animal), we need not worry about the type signature of selectional
restriction: by demanding dare
2→danger we have accomplished dare
2→ X,X 0→danger without lifting a finger. In general (not just for the
sake of making this particular case come out right) is a is a derived
notion, simply there to achieve economy in the system by means of lazy
default inheritance. If x is a y, then the small set of essential properties
associated to x is a superset of those associated to y, and elementary
pieces of link-tracing logic, such as x is a y ∧ y is a z ⇒ x is a z, or x
is a y ∧ y has z ⇒ x has z follow without any stipulation.
We make purposely very little distinction between an individual fox,
the species Vulpes vulpes, the set of foxes in the world, or the class
of potential foxes in all possible worlds. Even though such differences
can be sufficient for distinguishing different senses of the same word,
(compare Jack is blond ‘has blond hair’ to Jack is a blond ‘fulfills the
criteria for the stereotype), this is a peculiarity of English syntax, and
as such it has no place in the semantics.
What implicative verbs bring to the table (working memory) are
little lexically prespecified hypergraphs that demand abductive infer-
encing over and above the normal inferencing process, which we take
to be (hyper)graph unification. We assume, as is standard, that verbs
can subcategorize for their arguments: for example elapse demands a
time interval subject. If we read that A sekki elapsed we know that
this must refer to some time period even if we do not know the details
of the sekki5 system. This is part and parcel of knowing what elapse
means: people who cannot make this inference are not in full posses-
sion of the lexical entry. In the representation of elapse there is thus a
direct prespecification time period
1← elapse, which contrasts with the
prespecification inherited from a nominative linker NOM that subjects
are agentive (active, causing, volitional).
There is little reason to suppose that time intervals are inherently
5http://eco.mtk.nao.ac.jp/koyomi/faq/24sekki.html.en
Truth or dare / 517
active, that they causally contribute to their own elapsing. To the con-
trary, time interval is a abstract object and would therefore inherit
features of the latter such as lack
2→ volition that would directly
contradict agentivity. But once sekki appears in the subject slot of
elapse, it is a time interval and the inheritance of non-volitionality
from abstract object is blocked, since the specific, lexically prespec-
ified case will block the general inheritance mechanism as a matter of
course. Similarly, in the representation of dare, the object of daring is a
risk, and this will block the general assessment that e.g. chewing gum
is not normally considered a risk.
Another aspect of the analysis that is relatively easy in the frame-
work presented here is adding overcoming to the small set of preexist-
ing force dynamic primitives letting, hindering, and helping. Since this
would take us far afield from the issue at hand, we only sketch the basic
mechanism: verbs can, and often do refer to the state before and after
the action they depict: for example go simply means the conjunction
before at source, after at goal; while telic verbs carry the specifica-
tion after done. With these pieces at hand, we can dispense with the
force-dynamic diagrams entirely in favor of analytic statements such as
overcome ‘the agent, initially weaker than the object, is subsequently
stronger’. Since before and after are independently justified by other
verbal phenomena, as is the generic comparative binary relation er
(abstracted from greater, bigger, more), we can say before (force
2←
overcome ER force
1← overcome), after (force 1← overcome ER
force
2← overcome). As usual, it matters but little whether we call
the basis of the comparison force, power, might, heft, momentum, or
something else, there is a single concept here, and we chose to call
it force mainly to make clear our indebtedness to Talmy (1988) and
Jackendoff (1990).
In a standard system of logic such as first order predicate calculus
(FOPC) we would need at least two variables x and y, a one-place pred-
icate force and seven two-place predicates SubjectOf, ObjectOf, Before,
After, IsA, Has, and >, to express approximately the same meaning in
a conjunctive formula:
(2) Before((x IsA force & SubjectOf(x,overcome) & y IsA force &
ObjectOf(y,overcome) & y > x),overcome) & After((x IsA force
& SubjectOf(x,overcome) & y IsA force & ObjectOf(y,overcome)
& x > y),overcome)
even with the dubious expedient of reusing x and y in the Before and
After subformulas. To simplify matters, notice that the variable x is
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just a paraphrase ‘the force of the subject of overcome’ and similarly y
is ‘the force of the object of overcome’ so what we need to handle first
are binary relations that have a first and a second argument.
As readers of Kornai (2010a) will know, we will use machines in the
sense of Eilenberg (1974) to do this work. A binary machine will have
three partitions. The 0th or common partition will store all proper-
ties that hold for the entirety of the machine, e.g. that its printname is
overcome, or that various things may hold before or after the over-
coming. As with unaries, we do not make strict distinctions between a
machine, its printname, or a pointer to the machine. The distinguished
1st partition will store properties true of the subject (1st argument),
and the undistinguished 2nd partition to store properties that hold of
the object (2nd argument).
This skeletal apparatus is already sufficient for providing the mean-
ing representation of the bound morpheme -er: this will be a machine
that has printname er, and the only property it enjoys is that the rela-
tion > holds between whatever is stored on its distinguished (1st) and
undistinguished (2nd) partition. Largely similar is the machine for the
possessive relation: we give it printname has (but it could be called
own or poss just as well) and this has implications for the subject,
seen as the controller, and the active maintainer of the possession re-
lation; and also for the object, seen as the controlled element, the one
that cannot end the relation by itself.
We have already discussed unaries, seen as Eilenberg machines with
two partitions, the 0th holding the printname, and the 1st (distin-
guished) partition holding (pointers to) the characteristic properties of
the word being modeled (recall fox above). Note that is a is not a ma-
chine: we say x is a y iff the properties associated to x are a superset
of those associated to y. Here x and y are variables in the metalan-
guage, not in the object language. There are no ternary or higher arity
predicates – this is discussed in Kornai (2012).
We use cases such as nom and acc to effect the linking of subjects
to the first, and objects to the 2nd partition at least in nominative-
accusative languages: for ergative-absolutive this would be different.
At this level, the mechanism is very similar to the linking theories of
Kiparsky (1987) and Bierwisch (1988), see Chapter 5.5.1 of Butt (2006).
The main technical innovation is the elimination of variable binding by
means of machine substitution, taking advantage of the extra modeling
capability offered by the relational monoid X that is at the base of
Eilenberg machines. Members of X are relations (subsets of X2), and
if X has only two elements u, v we can use right multiplication with the
one-member relation (v, v) to model binding at u, and right multipli-
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cation with (u, u) to model binding at v. This way we can guarantee,
without recourse to variables, that the formula (or hypergraph) asso-
ciated to Brutus killed Caesar differs exactly in the expected way from
the one associated to Caesar killed Brutus.
Putting this all together, we start from highly skeletal lexical entries
such as dare = brave, do, and obtain, by finite state means, implica-
tions such as John chewed gum and chewing gum was risky (for John).
Again, it should be noted that the lexical entry for dare was not cre-
ated post festa, just to support this analysis, but existed in the 4lang
conceptual dictionary for some years now, see github.6 We owe a re-
cent bugfix, shifting the verbal base from try to do, to the heightened
scrutiny the entry received during the writing of this paper, but this
does not affect the main point, which is to get from the subject’s brav-
ery (as posited in the actual entry) to the object’s riskiness (the notion
we relied on above).
This inferencing is accomplished by the same process, substitution
salva veritate of the definition of brave in the subject position, so that
we obtain ‘subject has courage’. Now what about courage? Again sub-
stituting the definition ‘will er fear’ we obtain ‘subject has greater
willpower than fear’ and it is by yet another substitution, that fear is
not just any old mental state, but one that danger cause that we fi-
nally derive the conclusion that the object of dare is indeed dangerous.
As in many parts of the lexicon, there can be serious disagreement over
how much of this is precomputed and already stored in the lexicon,
see e.g. Pinker and Prince (1988), and defending one analysis over the
other would take as far afield from the central theme of this paper,
which is the finite state mechanism, the weak (proto)logic calculus one
can use in deriving the meaning of the whole from the meanings of the
parts.
22.4 Memory
Starting perhaps with Yngve (1961), linguists have long wrestled with
assessing the impact on sentence processing of the limitations of short-
term or working memory (Miller, 1956). The bulk of this work concerns
syntax and takes it for granted that the central issue is dealing with the
linear succession of words. Island parsing techniques, based on the idea
that a full parse may be built from well-understood subgrammars, came
two decades later (Carroll, 1983), and it was only under the impact
of Ken Church’s famous declaration, parsers don’t work, that interest
in partial parses, such as offered by light parsing (Abney, 1991), was
6https://github.com/kornai/4lang
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beginning to be seen as legitimate.
If our focus is with semantics, the defining data structure of sequen-
tial processing, the tapes common to FSA, FSTs, and Turing machines,
appear neither relevant nor particularly useful. Clearly, humans have
huge long-term memory, but there is no reason whatsoever to sup-
pose that this memory is sequentially organized outside of procedu-
ral/episodic memory. In particular, the bulk of linguistic information is
stored in the lexicon, a device that is best thought of as random access.
The classic model of computation best suited to random access of this
sort is the Kolmogorov -complex ( ), originating with Kolmogorov
(1953) – for a more accessible introduction see Ch. 1 of Uspensky and
Semenov (1993). There are more modern concepts, in particular the
Storage Modification Machine of Scho¨nhage (1980), the Pointer Ma-
chine of Shvachko (1991), and the Random Access Computer of Angluin
and Valiant (1979) – for a good discussion, see Gurevich (1988).
We are in no position to make a compelling case for one over the
other, but the key issue, as emphasized by Gurevich, is that all these
models are “more appropriate for lower time complexities like real time
or linear time” than the standard Turing Machine. There is in fact an
important line of research, starting with Quillian (1967) and today
best exemplified by the Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR) the-
ory Banarescu et al. (2013), that shares much of the tools, concepts,
and formal underpinnings of the theory described above. All these the-
ories, called ‘algebraic conceptual representation’ (ACR) in Kornai and
Kracht (2015), take the lexical entries, and the knowledge representa-
tions, to be (hyper)graphs, just as the family of models. While
AMR operates with hypergraph rewriting, and the theory presented
here uses Eilenberg machines to build larger graphs from the elemen-
tary (lexical) pieces, directly transduces one graph to the next
one.
Whichever model we choose (and there is quite a rich variety to
choose from, for example Kornai (1987) uses equational systems as
defined in Curry and Feys (1958)), the key, most compelling notion
these theories have since Quillian is spreading activation. This is island
parsing writ large, beginning with nouns, named entities, and NPs, de-
tection of case marking, assembly of clausal structure, and verbal slot
filling. At every stage, morphemes, words, or larger lexical entries are
active, and by spreading activation so are their links. A structure is
detected whenever two such spreading waves of activation meet. Prag-
matics, in the sense relevant to our understanding of dare and other
implicatives, is simply an effort to find paths where none initially exist.
There is clearly no link, at least initially, from chewing gum to danger.
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But the post-verbal position really compels a reading whereby chewing
gum is the object of dare, so we make the link, and now chewing gum is
risky. Speakers are of course very aware that such sense-making activity
is under way. They use it to eliminate redundancy, and abuse it to set
up semantic traps like when did you stop beating your wife.
22.5 Conclusions
The lower predicate calculus (FOPC) is a wonder to behold: it is highly
expressive, has good model theory, excellent proof theory, and a com-
pleteness theorem cementing the link between these two. It enjoys the
compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem properties – in fact, according to
Lindstro¨m’s Theorem, it is the strongest among those systems of logic
that have these two properties. Though Montague (1973) had good rea-
sons to reach for higher order calculi, there have been continued efforts
to bring natural language semantics down to first order, see in partic-
ular Blackburn and Bos (2005). But these efforts do not go far enough
to curb the logic’s hunger for resources: the simple task of checking
that each quantifier bounds some variable is conjectured (Marsh and
Partee, 1984) to be properly context sensitive, outside the power of
indexed grammars, let alone the mildly context sensitive class.
Given that the mainstream theory of linguistic quantification still
leaves a lot to be desired (Kornai, 2010b), a less ambitious form of logic
that reduces quantification to genericity (use of defaults), and sacrifices
scope effects may actually be a better fit with the semantics of natural
language, and this is what we propose here. The system presented here
is not even fully Boolean: conjunctions are everywhere, but disjunction
is hard, and negation practically nonexistent, except for overt mark-
ing of failure of defaults, for example in taking blind to mean lack
2→ sight, or even a unuary analysis with sight 0→ lack. This actu-
ally goes a long way towards explaining classic pragmatic puzzles, why
#blind stone is infelicitous, and how can a cup be felicitously defined
as a ‘small round container for liquids, with or without a handle’, given
that everything is with or without a handle. At the same time it sug-
gests caution with regards to relying on negation as the touchstone for
implicature, especially as there is a whole lot of inferencing going on in
positive contexts already, and the kind of logical semantics that takes
Booleans for granted has no traction whatsoever over the central body
of primary linguistic data.
Broadly speaking, all ‘algebraic’ approaches (among which we count
not just classic AI models and AMR, but also Pa¯n. ini) are like Gen-
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erative Semantics7 in that they proceed from meaning representation
to surface form directly, without any reliance on LF, and view inter-
pretation as the inverse task, analysis by synthesis. Such systems have
no room for quantifier scoping,8 and have been roundly rejected by AI
greats like McCarthy (2005): “people who put knowledge into comput-
ers need mathematical logic, including quantifiers, as much as engineers
need calculus”. However, putting knowledge into computers is a goal
very different from the goals of linguistics, in that people can acquire
a great deal of knowledge for which there is no language-level support,
starting with elementary arithmetic. To sustain this kind of scientific
knowledge needs a logic that is considerably stronger than the proto-
logic we rely on here.
The problem with these stronger logics is not so much that they are
undecidable (they are), or hard to compute with (all systems in common
use carry SAT9 and other NP-complete problems), for clever limitations
placed on the mechanism can avoid these pitfalls. The problem is that
they are unlearnable in a strong sense. What we need is not just a
model, but a path from primary data to this particular model within
a reasonable hypothesis space. The general problem of learning FSA is
already incredibly hard (Angluin, 1987), but somehow we all learn what
dare means, so this must be a rather simple information object, selected
from a very narrow hypothesis space. Our candidate information object
is a graph with a few links to nodes already in the system. Here we
laid out a plausible path toward a learnable theory, but there is a
clear esthetics-driven choice here: one must decide whether to search
for truth, in the narrow sense of catering to the needs of knowledge
engineers, or try to build explanatory models that can learn dare.
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